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Abstract
In Experiment 1, six capuchins lifted a weight during a 10-minute session to receive a food piece. 
Across conditions, the weight was increased across six different amounts for three different food 
types. The number of food pieces obtained as a function of the weight lifted was fitted by a 
demand equation that is hypothesized to quantify food value. For most subjects, this analysis 
showed that the three food types differed little in value. In Experiment 2, these monkeys were 
given pairwise choices among these food types. In 13 of 18 comparisons, preferences at least 
equaled a 3-to-1 ratio; in seven comparisons, preference was absolute. There was no relation 
between values based on degree of preference versus values based on the demand equation. When 
choices in the present report were compared to similar data with these subjects from another study, 
between-study lability in preference emerged. This outcome contrasts with the finding in demand 
analysis that test-retest reliability is high. We attribute the unreliability and extreme assignment of 
value based on preference tests to high substitutability between foods. We suggest use of demand 
analysis instead of preference tests for studies that compare the values of different foods. A better 
strategy might be to avoid manipulating value by using different foods. Where possible, value 
should be manipulated by varying amounts of a single food type because, over an appropriate 
range, more food is consistently more valuable than less. Such an approach would be immune to 
problems in between-food substitutability.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Lindsay Schwartz, Department of Psychology, American University, 
Washington, DC 20016. lindsaypschwartz@gmail.com.
Anna Casey, Department of Psychology, American University
Lindsay Schwartz, Department of Psychology, American University
Alan Silberberg, Department of Psychology, American University
HHS Public Access
Author manuscript
Anim Cogn. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 May 01.
Published in final edited form as:
Anim Cogn. 2016 May ; 19(3): 631–641. doi:10.1007/s10071-016-0967-4.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
Keywords
behavioral economics; exponential model of demand; choice; monkeys
The goal of the present report is to introduce a behavioral-economic technique for scaling 
reward value. We review the relevant history below and consider the well-known inequity-
aversion test of Brosnan and de Waal (2003) as one experimental context to illustrate why a 
behavioral-economic approach may have utility for comparative psychologists. We 
underscore that this work does not test inequity aversion. Instead, this topic frames the 
discussion of the measure of value.
A Selective History of Measuring Reinforcer Value
The question of how to scale the value of a reward has been of enduring interest to animal 
learning theorists. Skinner (1932a, 1932b) noted that the form of the curve created by 
graphing amount of food consumed as a function of time was unchanged whether the food 
was consumed directly, or delivered as a consequence of a lever press. Based on this 
outcome, he argued that the rate of lever pressing could serve as a surrogate for the strength 
of the eating reflex.
In many contexts, response rate serves as a good measure of reinforcer value. For example, 
Clark (1958) found response rates correlated with both the rate of reinforcement a schedule 
provides and with manipulations of hours of food deprivation. These successes 
notwithstanding, response-rate measures often encounter a problem with ceiling effects: If 
an animal is responding at its highest rate for a reinforcer, subsequent increases in reinforcer 
value cannot result in still higher response rates. In consequence, response rate is often 
insensitive to value changes that occur when reinforcer values are already high.
An alternative scheme is to measure value not in terms of changes in response rate, but in 
terms of changes in preference. Herrnstein (1970) found that with two variable-interval (VI) 
schedules that provide the same food reinforcer, the relative response rate (response to one 
VI divided by all responses) often equaled the relative reinforcement rate (reinforcers from 
that VI divided by all reinforcers). If one assumes that the value of an alternative that 
provides twice as much reinforcement as another is two-to-one, the finding of twice as much 
responding to the alternative providing twice as much value raises the possibility that 
relative response rate offers a linear scale of the relative value of two identical reinforcers.
Preference models such as Herrnstein’s (1970) assume what Krantz (1964) has called 
“simple scalability”—the existence of a single monotonic dimension of, say, “likeability” in 
which preference maps subjective relative value or utility. Unfortunately, this assumption is 
likely wrong. Microeconomic studies in the human economy have shown that preference 
varies not just as a function of value, but also as a function of other factors such as 
substitutability.
The substitutability of two goods is defined by the degree to which increases in the price of 
one good leads to greater consumption (demand) of the other good. For example, raising the 
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price of white eggs leads to increases in demand for brown eggs, an outcome indicating 
these goods are substitutable. Alternatively, there are complementary goods where 
increasing the price of one decreases demand for both. For example, if the price of tennis 
racquets increased, you might expect demand for both racquets and tennis balls to decrease.
Hursh (1978) demonstrated that such observations translate directly into monkey behavior. 
In his study, preferences for two foods indicated they were highly substitutable. When the 
price of one food increased—a circumstance arranged by requiring more responding to 
produce food—the demand for the other food increased. However, when the choice was 
between food and water and the price of water increased, the demand for both food and 
water decreased, indicating the two were complements.
This history shows that scaling the value of two goods depends on how the goods interact in 
terms of substitutability. Yet these dependencies seldom seem of concern to specialists in 
areas cognate to learning theory. Typically, when two qualitatively different goods are to be 
compared in choice or some other arrangement, some investigators define the value of two 
goods based on a pretest in which the foods are compared solely by a trials-based preference 
test (e.g., delay discounting: Beran, Savage-Rumbaugh, Pate, & Rumbaugh 1999; Evans & 
Beran 2007; inequity aversion: Brosnan & de Waal 2003; food variety and food preference: 
Addessi, Mancini, Crescimbene, Ariely & Visalberghi 2010).
An Illustration of the Utility of a Behavioral-Economic Approach
The use of preference tests to assign relative value may be consequential. For example, 
consider inequity aversion—a phenomenon based on the idea that when one of a pair of 
adjacent monkeys or apes gets a higher-value good, the other of the pair is upset when it is 
offered a lower-value good. This inequity is reflected in that animal’s increased likelihood to 
reject the lower-value good even though in other contexts this good was acceptable for 
consumption (e.g., see female capuchin data in Brosnan & de Waal 2003).
Community acceptance of this phenomenon has been burdened by questions of its definition 
(Henrich 2004), and possible procedural confounds (Roma, Silberberg, Ruggiero & Suomi 
2006); however, its greatest burden may well be the difficulty some investigators have had in 
reproducing its effects (e.g., male capuchins in Brosnan & de Waal 2003; McAuliffe, Chang, 
Leimgruber, Spaulding, Blake, & Santos 2015; Sheskin, Ashayeri, Skerry, & Santos 2014; 
Silberberg, Crescimbene, Addessi, Anderson, & Visalberghi 2009).
The typical procedure for assigning value to different foods used in inequity tests is based on 
a pretest to determine which food is preferred and which food is not. The relative value of 
the two foods presented in choice is scaled by the percentage of choices of the preferred 
food. While the question we ask likely holds for all studies that use a preference test to 
assign values, current research interest in the inequity effect makes it a useful context in 
which to present subsequent discussion.
To illustrate the relative-value research problem, Silberberg et al. (2009) claimed in their 
failed inequity test that their preferred and unpreferred foods were comparable to those used 
in Brosnan and de Waal’s (2003) demonstration of inequity because in both cases the 
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preferred food garnered approximately 90% of the choices in a preference pretest. However, 
as argued above, economic substitutability affects preference interactions between goods. 
Perhaps this equation of preference was due not to comparable relative values, but to degree 
of substitutability. If these goods were highly substitutable, a small difference in value could 
translate into a large difference in preference.
To make this point clear, we borrow a human-economy example from Casey, Silberberg, 
Paukner, & Suomi (2014). Imagine a consumer is given a choice between identically priced 
cars that differ in only one regard—one has leather seats and the other has vinyl seats. We 
would expect consumers to show a large preference for the car with leather seats, an 
outcome suggesting a large value difference if judged solely by the standard that size of 
preference defines relative value. However, what would happen if you used not the metric of 
the primatologist studying the inequity effect, but rather that of the microeconomist? 
Entertaining that these goods are highly substitutable, the microeconomist might test the 
possibility that the value difference is small even though the preference is large. To make 
this test, all that need be done is raise the price of the car with leather seats a small fraction 
of its total cost—say, $200. If there were now a large change in preference toward the car 
with vinyl seats, it would be clear that the value difference between these cars was small (it 
took only a small price increase to change preference), despite what a prior preference test 
based on equally priced cars suggests. The microeconomist would find these outcomes 
unsurprising: Given that these goods share virtually all characteristics (seat covering is the 
sole difference), small price changes should produce large shifts in preference, just like they 
do when consumers evaluate price changes in deciding whether to buy white or brown eggs.
In some of the studies where inequity aversion has failed (e.g., McAuliffe et al., 2015; 
Silberberg et al. 2009) the foods offered in the pre-experimental preference test were 
categorically the same (two cereals in McAuliffe et al.; two seeds in Silberberg et al.). In 
contrast, in the original demonstration of inequity aversion (Brosnan & de Waal 2003), a 
fruit and a vegetable were compared. Based on an economic analysis, finding a large 
preference between categorically substitutable goods (seed versus seed and fruit versus fruit) 
may represent a smaller value difference than that when a fruit is compared with a vegetable 
as in Brosnan and de Waal even if the preferences for one good over another were 
comparable in all studies. Given that inequity aversion presumes a monkey analog of human 
inequity aversion, demonstration of the effect may require a large value difference between 
goods. In the absence of a large difference, a monkey or a human may not feel inequitably 
treated simply because they prefer one to the other. Based on this analysis from economics, 
the possibility exists that Silberberg et al. (2009) and McAuliffe et al. (2015) failed to show 
inequity aversion because the value differences between the two goods were not large, 
despite large preference differences.
Exponential Model of Demand
These points call for a new approach, one based on economic analysis. Casey et al. (2014) 
engaged in such an approach, termed cross-modal scaling. In their report, they scaled 
preferences of two putatively highly substitutable goods (fruits) to a third, putatively less 
substitutable good (cereal). They found that when two fruits were compared, monkey 
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preferences for one over the other were very high. However, when fruit was scaled against a 
cereal, the preferences for that same fruit were much lower. They argued that the value of the 
fruits should be scaled in terms of the number of pieces of cereal necessary to produce 
indifference in choice between a fruit type and cereal.
The Casey et al. (2014) scaling technique holds promise as an alternative to a simple 
preference test because it could be easily conducted before using qualitatively different 
foods in an experiment. However, a more time-tested method is available, based on work 
with economic demand curves.
As used with nonhumans, a demand curve is a graphical representation of consumption 
plotted against price where price is defined as the amount of work (e.g., number of lever 
presses) required to “buy” a reward. The results mirror those of the human economy: as 
prices increase, consumption decreases, resulting in a positively accelerated, monotone-
decreasing function in consumption (Y axis), price (X axis) space. When microeconomists 
find that price increases lead to disproportionately large decreases in consumption, demand 
for that good is termed “elastic.” Conversely, if consumption decreases are 
disproportionately small, they are “inelastic.” Demand for necessities (e.g., food) tends to be 
inelastic while demand for luxuries (e.g., going to the movies) tends to be elastic. Hursh 
(1980) argued that the degree of inelasticity could serve as a plausible scale of a good’s 
value—the more inelastic the demand, the greater the value of the good.
Hursh and Silberberg (2008) created the following equation to model demand curves:
(1)
The independent variable, C, is the cost of the good based on the effort required to produce 
it. Q0 and α are free parameters estimated from the best-fit function. The span of the 
exponential-decay function, k, equals the estimated range of the dependent variable, Q. The 
function ranges between Q0 at a price of zero to Q0–k at infinite price. The exponential term, 
Q0C, represents the true cost of the reinforcer adjusted for the level of responding required 
to defend a Q0 level of demand. The parameters Q0 and α signify, respectively, the 
maximum level of consumption at minimal price, and the rate constant of the exponential, 
which sets the sensitivity of demand to increases in price.
Hursh and Silberberg (2008) argue that when their equation is applied to a demand curve, it 
creates a single parameter, α, the size of which is inversely related to value. Thus, using the 
equation with a demand curve created by a particular reward, the essential value of that 
reward can be scaled by 1/α and compared to the 1/α scores of other rewards.
The present report uses their technique in a new setting. Traditionally, price is manipulated 
by changing the number of responses that an animal must emit in order to receive a reward. 
As is typically the case in demand-curve generation in nonhumans, labor is directly 
exchanged for goods, without the intermediary of money (i.e., a barter system). In this study, 
unlike others, price is defined not by the number of responses emitted per reinforcer, but by 
the amount of weight an animal worker will lift for a given good. In Experiment 1, a demand 
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curve was constructed by recording consumption of a food as function of the weight lifted to 
produce it. By modeling the demand curve with Equation 1, it should be possible to assign 
an essential value to different foods. In Experiment 2, we use the same foods in Experiment 
1 in a preference test in order to determine how essential value and preference relate to one 
another as metrics for scaling value. In both experiments, two foods were different fruits and 
a third was a cereal—a good presumably less substitutable for a fruit than one fruit is for 
another (Casey et al. 2014).
The behavioral economist has four expectations from these experiments. First, as price for 
the reward increases, demand for it should decrease. Second, in terms of a demand analysis, 
fruits will differ less in value from one another than they will from cereal. Third, in choice 
between two fruits versus choice between a fruit and a cereal, the preference differences will 
be larger for the more substitutable goods, the fruits, than for the fruit-versus-cereal choice. 
Finally, the size of the preference for a good will not be highly correlated with demand. 
Instead, preference size may be better predicted by the substitutability of the goods offered 
in choice rather than the value predictions of an analysis based on demand curves.
Experiment 1
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to generate demand curves for three different foods, two 
fruits and one cereal. By applying the exponential model of demand to the data obtained, it 
was possible to define each good’s value to the animal consumer.
Method
Subjects—Six adult male tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) housed in indoor cages 
(1.78-m high by 9-m wide by 1.85-m deep) at the NICHD Laboratory of Comparative 
Ethology in Poolesville, MD served as subjects. They were pair housed in two cage arrays, 
each occupying different sides of the animal-colony room. They were fed biscuit and treat 
rations in the morning and the afternoon, and had unrestricted access to water. Daily 
enrichment was available in the form of toys placed in the home cages, which were removed 
during testing. Subjects were divided into two groups based on which cage array they 
occupied. One group was composed of two pair-housed subjects (four subjects in total). The 
other was composed of one monkey from each of two pairs of monkeys (two monkeys in 
total). The two groups were tested on alternating days, five days per week. All applicable 
international, national, and/or institutional guidelines for the care and use of animals were 
followed and approved by IACUC.
Apparatus—All monkeys were tested in a steel and Plexiglas chamber (45-cm high by 40-
cm wide by 48-cm deep) that was attached to the home cage. A Lee’s Kritter Krawler Small 
Animal Ball (a toy made for rodents) was attached to one end of a 43-cm long blue plastic 
chain, the other end of which was attached to the lower of two bars in front of the chamber. 
The weight of the ball was adjusted by unscrewing a cap on the bottom of the ball, and 
inserting either 14- or 28-g steel fishing sinkers inside. Each monkey was separated from its 
cage mate at the time of testing by closing the back door of the chamber. A white board was 
put up to block the subject’s sight of other monkeys in the room.
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Procedure—Subjects were given one session every other day during the interval between 
their morning and afternoon rations. Each trial began with the experimenter seated 
approximately 0.5 m in front of the chamber with her open hand showing a food reward, and 
the weighted ball-and-chain apparatus hanging downward from the subject’s chamber. If a 
response occurred—defined as pulling the chain until the ball at the other end could go no 
farther, or until the subject held the ball in its hands—the experimenter immediately 
delivered the reinforcer in her hand. Typically, the subject released the chain to grasp the 
food reinforcer. On those occasions when the monkey did not release the raised chain, it was 
immediately taken from the monkey’s grasp and extended toward the floor. The next trial 
began immediately after the food item was taken by the subject. Each session ended after 10 
min, regardless of subject behavior.
Each of the six phases of this experiment consisted of two sessions in which the subject 
responded by lifting a specified weight to receive a particular food reinforcer. Each of the 
weights defining a phase (64, 191, 319, 574, 1084 and 2015 g) was presented in ascending 
order. By virtue of this arrangement it took 12 sessions (2 sessions X 6 different weights) to 
complete a single determination of the response frequency of each subject to the three 
different rewards (two different fruits and one cereal) used in this study. The types of 
rewards used and their sizes and order of presentation were the same as in Casey et al. 
(2014; see Table 1 for a list of each subject’s reward types and the order of food types across 
phases in the present study). Each food reward was cut to the size of a piece of cereal. All 
monkeys were familiar with pulling the plastic chains, but not with the attached ball. 
Therefore, they were given one 10-min pretest session in order to give them experience with 
the task. Each was reinforced with the first fruit type identified in Table 1. All monkeys 
mastered the task in this pretest session.
Results and Discussion
Figure 1 presents the number of reinforcers each subject obtained as a function of weight in 
grams averaged over the two sessions defining each weight, food-type condition for each 
subject (rows of figure) and each food type (columns of figure). As expected, each of these 
demand curves shows that as the effort required to complete a response increased, the 
number of responses (and, hence, food consumption) tended to decrease.
It should be noted that in this test, increasing price through an increase in weight likely 
affected several variables including the rate of reinforcement and the topography of the 
monkey’s response. For example, lifting a heavier weight would be expected to reduce the 
rate of reward if, say, the monkey rested after lifting a heavier weight. As regards response 
typography, perhaps heavier weights required monkeys to “put their back into it” while 
lighter weights did not. The general approach of demand analysis has been to ignore such 
factors, and only look for orderly functional relations between price and demand. That order 
is evident in Figure 1. Whatever the impact of weight on reward rate and response 
topography might be, it is well described by the exponential model of demand.
In Figure 2, the data from Figure 1 were normalized using the procedure outlined in Hursh 
and Winger (1995). The purpose of normalization is to accommodate differences in 
consumptions of different food types by different subjects. The normalization procedure sets 
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maximal consumption at the theoretically lowest price of zero weight for each subject and 
food type. Each value is divided by that subject’s Q0 for that particular food and multiplied 
by 100. To normalize price, each weight was multiplied by Q0 and then divided by 100. The 
exponential demand equation was then fitted to the logarithm of normalized consumption as 
a function of the logarithm of normalized price. The parameter k was set at 10, which was 
held constant across all data sets.
Figure 2 combines all three demand curves and sorts them by subject. In consequence, it is 
easy to compare how a given subject values each of the three foods offered in the experiment 
simply by comparison of the curves. Notice that Lenny’s demand curves essentially 
superimpose, an outcome showing that he values all of these foods nearly identically. Jaws 
mimics this result in terms of blueberry and Cheerios (these curves superimpose), but 
demand for banana is discernibly weaker for this subject. Except for Jaws’ demand for 
banana and the entire data set of Icarus, subjects in this experiment show little difference in 
demand among the food types they were offered. Table 1 presents the essential value (1/α—
that is, the degree to which a subject defends consumption of a particular food as the price of 
that food increases) and r2 data for each curve in Figure 2.
Figure 3 presents the essential value data for all of the foods used in this report as a function 
of their order of presentation. As is apparent, the two fruits have nearly identical essential 
values, while the values for cereal appear somewhat higher. A one-way ANOVA was used to 
determine there was no significant difference among the average α values, indicating no 
differences in essential-value determinations or, for that matter, among the food types [F (2, 
15) = .19, p = .83; 95% CI (8.00E+5, 1.66E+6].
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 provided data on the essential value of foods based on the exponential model 
of demand. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to assess relative value between pairs of goods 
based on a preference test, and to compare the outcomes obtained with the essential-value 
data from Experiment 1.
Subjects—The subjects used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2.
Apparatus—Subjects were tested in the steel and Plexiglas testing box used in Experiment 
1; however, the chain-pull apparatus was not present.
Procedure—The rewards used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. Each trial 
began by presenting the monkey with two reward options, 38 cm apart on a 33- by 40.5-cm 
plastic board, and advancing the board to within the subject’s reach. A choice consisted of 
reaching with one hand for one of the two rewards. Each subject was tested twice in a 30- 
trial session for a total of 60 trials. Twenty of these trials were assigned to each of the three 
reward pairs (fruit 1 versus fruit 2, fruit 1 versus cereal, and fruit 2 versus cereal). Trials 
were randomized within each session, and the rewards counterbalanced on each side of the 
plastic board. In other regards, the procedure was unchanged from Experiment 1.
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Results and Discussion
Figure 4 plots essential value in Experiment 1 as a function of preference rank in 
Experiment 2 (see Table 2 for preference data). This figure shows that value as measured by 
preference shows no agreement with value as defined by a demand analysis. This outcome 
forces a critical question: Given the absence of empirical compatibility, which of these two 
measures should one use to index value?
In the Introduction, we noted that measures of preference between qualitatively different 
goods are inherently flawed because the value of a good changes as a function of its 
substitutability with the alternative good present in choice. Thus, we questioned test validity. 
By obviating choice, the demand analysis presented in this report is immune to this 
criticism. While this fact supports favoring a demand analysis, this is support by argument, 
not by demonstration. To add evidence to argument, we now offer data that illustrate the 
superiority of a demand analysis not in terms of validity, but of reliability.
The preference test used in Experiment 2 was designed to replicate the preference test from 
Casey et al. (2014), using not only the same foods in the same amounts, but also the same 
subjects, albeit with a three-year delay. Figure 5 plots these data as the relative fruit-1 choice 
frequency (choice of fruit 1 divided by all choices) in the present study as a function of the 
relative fruit-1 choice frequency in Casey et al. (2014). The diagonal line drawn from the 
origin defines perfect stability of preference between these successive preference tests. 
These data show preference is labile and the line of perfect stability accommodates a 
minority of the data variance (r2=.31). This result echoes similar findings in other studies 
where lability in test-retest reliability assessments has been seen (e.g., Addessi et al. 2010).
Although we have no test-retest reliability data for the demand curves in the present report, 
prior work shows that demand analyses are not similarly troubled. The food-reinforcer data 
from Raslear, Bauman, Hursh, Shurtleff and Simmons (1988; see Figure 2A) and Cassidy 
and Dallery (2012; see Figure 10) show that demand curves change little across 
redeterminations. Hence, in terms of reliability, demand analysis seems superior to a 
preference test in determining the value of a reinforcer.
It is easy to rationalize the lability of preference in test-retest comparisons in Figure 5. With 
highly substitutable goods (fruit versus fruit), small differences between their characteristics 
can result to exclusive choice of one alternative over another. As argued in the Introduction, 
a small price change could dramatically shift preference between highly similar cars. If these 
goods differed more in substitutability (e.g., a car versus a motorcycle), preference would be 
less labile, a fact that would be reflected by requiring larger price changes to alter 
preferences. Taking this point farther, consider what would happen if the goods were not 
substitutable at all (e.g., tires and cars needing tire replacement). You would find preference 
to be largely invariant (e.g., purchase of four tires for every car) across large changes in price 
for one or the other good. For this reason, we find it unsurprising that many of the fruit-
versus-fruit preferences were absolute, an outcome consistent with the idea that these goods 
do not differ widely in value even though preference differences were large. Indeed, only 
when these goods are compared in a demand analysis can the small value differences 
between them be discerned (e.g., see Lenny in Figure 2).
Schwartz et al. Page 9
Anim Cogn. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2016 May 01.
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
A
uthor M
an
u
script
This argument supports two predictions for Experiment 2. Regarding the first prediction, 
when value is measured in terms of preference (relative choice frequencies), the differences 
between highly substitutable goods should often be greater and more labile than between 
goods that are less substitutable. In other words, the size of this preference should be less for 
fruit versus cereal than for fruit versus fruit, just as should be the case for the preference 
between a car without tires and new tires, compared to the preference between two tire 
brands.
This prediction was evaluated in Figure 6a. It presents the absolute differences between 
choices for fruit 1 versus fruit 2, and between either fruit versus cereal. While the data are 
ordinally consistent with the prediction—they show a greater preference difference between 
the putatively more substitutable pair of goods (fruit versus fruit rather than fruit versus 
cereal)— this difference is not statistically significant [t (16) = .68, p = .51, 95% CI (−5.29, 
10.29)].
The second prediction was evaluated in Figure 6b—that when value is assessed by a demand 
analysis, the smaller preference seen for the less substitutable goods (fruits versus cereals) 
nevertheless differ more in value from each other than the pairs of fruits. As seen in this 
panel, this prediction is apparent and statistically significant [t (16) = −2.322, p = .03, 95% 
CI (−3.75E+5, −1.71E+4), d= −1.16].
It is also possible to test the significance of the conjoint prediction that the fruit-versus-
cereal preference difference should be lower than the fruit-versus-fruit comparison in the top 
panel even though a value determination from a demand analysis in the lower panel supports 
the opposite conclusion. We tested this conjoint prediction with concatenated chi-square 
tests (see Winer, 1971), and it is statistically significant [χ2 (2, N = 2) = 10.90, p < .03, 
V=1.16].
General Discussion
In Experiment 1, we recorded the frequency with which a monkey would lift a particular 
weight for each of three foods in a 10-min session. All performances followed the Law of 
Demand: As “price” increased across sessions, an outcome arranged by increasing the 
amount of effort the monkey expended to lift a weight for a food item, the number of food 
items “purchased” decreased. Regardless of the food type, the demand curves generated by 
this price manipulation were well-described by Equation 1. If this equation is given 
credence, a single parameter, α, is inversely related to the value of each food. When scaled 
in terms of essential value (1/α) the three food types did not differ much from one another 
for four of the six monkeys (see Figure 2), and there were no significant differences in their 
values (see Figure 3).
Experiment 2 measured value another way, by looking at preferences among the three foods 
when they were offered in pairwise choice. This measure assumes that if one good is of 
more value than another, it would be preferred, and the greater the difference in preference, 
the greater the difference in value. One might anticipate that these measures would be 
closely related to one another. However, Figure 4 shows that there is no relation between the 
value scores based on a preference test and those based on the exponential model of demand 
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(Equation 1). This outcome leads to an important question: which of these two measures is 
to be preferred as a value measure?
We argued that Equation 1 is the superior measure of value because it is less labile in its 
value designations than is a preference test. We demonstrated the lability of preference tests 
by comparing between-fruit preference data in this study against those from a prior study in 
which the same fruits and monkeys were used. We found little relation between these 
successive preference tests (see Figure 5). Given these data are not consistent in 
redetermination, it seems difficult to assign relative value to goods offered in choice based 
on historical preference data. As noted above (although not demonstrated in this study), 
reliability across redeterminations is a consistent characteristic of essential value as 
measured by demand analysis because α scores from Equation 1 are largely unchanged 
across redeterminations.
The greater stability of α favors its use over degree of preference as a measure of value. 
Indeed, at least for the data shown in Experiment 2, to argue otherwise is to endorse a 
measure of value that is in flux. Nevertheless, the greater stability of α matters little if α is 
not a plausible correlate of what could sensibly be called “value.” Microeconomists view it 
as sensible, and often use the so-called “diamond-water paradox” to illustrate to students its 
superiority over preference measures. In many circumstances, a diamond is preferred to a 
glass of water. If, however, each good is scarce, this preference would reverse—that is, 
consumers would defend their water consumption over a diamond. As is apparent, this 
reversal in choice is only paradoxical if one insists value is measured by preference. 
Measured by demand analysis, there is no paradox because consumers will quit defending 
diamond consumption before they will quit defending water consumption. Water is the 
higher-value good.
We believe researchers would be better served by valuing foods by demand analysis. Given 
the stability that is evident in demand-determined essential values, these determinations 
might only need to be done once for a given animal, and then could be generally applied 
without being repeated in subsequent studies. Alternatively, researchers might abjure use of 
qualitatively different foods, using instead different food amounts. Indeed, in terms of the 
variability of outcome in inequity aversion tests, one can be confident that more food of the 
same kind is of greater value than less food, at least for modest amounts. This expected 
result has nothing to do with substitutability. Rather it is due to a large income difference 
between identical foods in different amounts offered in choice.
Ironically, the notion of nonhuman inequity aversion is derived from a literature where all 
tests of the effect are based on payoff differences where a single good (i.e., money) is used 
(Fehr & Schmidt 1999). Given this fact, it is curious that tests of nonhuman inequity 
aversion are typically based on goods that vary not in amount, but in kind. Perhaps if 
nonhuman inequity aversion in monkeys was tested using, say, one versus four raisins, a 
robust inequity effect would emerge that endures incidental variation in procedure and 
species. Indeed, there is a large literature in choice that supports the view not only that more 
is preferred to less, but that such effects are consistently reproducible both within subjects 
and between species.
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From the perspective of a microeconomist, presenting different amounts of a unitary good in 
choice should result in preferences for larger-over-smaller amounts. However, even with 
such an arrangement, preference levels are sensitive to income levels. For example, Hastjarjo 
and Silberberg (1992) found in a delay-discounting design that impulsivity grew with food 
income level when rats earned their daily food ration within the experiment. Thus, the 
degree of rat impulsivity was not simply a consequence of a species’ patience; it was also a 
consequence of its session-wide income. If a daily ration could be earned by behaving 
impulsively, rats do so; if not, they become patient. Related income effects have also been 
noted when the goods offered in choice differ in kind (e.g., Elsmore, Fletcher, Conrad, & 
Sodetz 1980). Data such as these join those presented in this report in pointing to the 
importance of understanding the economy in which psychological processes are evaluated. 
Once this is understood, studies in which foods of contrasting value are to be presented 
might have the differences expressed in terms of food amounts, and not food qualities.
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Figure 1. 
Number of pieces of food consumed as a function of the weight lifting in g required to 
produce each piece. Columns present food type and rows present performances for each 
subject.
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Figure 2. 
Normalized number of food pieces consumed by each subject as a function of the 
normalized weight in g that had to be lifted to produce a piece of food. See text for 
explanation of the normalization method. Equation 1 is fitted to the data in each panel. All 
food types are presented in each panel so that the different demand curves for each food type 
may be compared visually. Both axes are logarithmically scaled
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Figure 3. 
The across-subject mean essential values of each of three food types. F1 refers to the first 
fruit used, F2 refers to the second fruit used, and C refers to the cereal used. The error bars 
define the 95% confidence intervals
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Figure 4. 
The essential value of each food type for each subject as a function of the ordinal rank of 
preference from a preference test. The proportion of data variance accommodated by the 
best-fit function drawn through the data is also presented
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Figure 5. 
Relative response rate for fruit 1 (choices of fruit 1 divided by all fruit choices) from Casey 
et al. (2014) as a function of relative response rate for fruit 1 from the present report. The 
diagonal through the plot defines the locus of perfect invariance in outcome between these 
two determinations
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Figure 6. 
Panel a presents the mean and the 95% confidence intervals of the mean for the absolute 
difference in the number of choices of food items when both foods were fruits (left bar) and 
when one was a fruit and the other a cereal (right bar). Panel b presents the mean and 95% 
confidence intervals of the mean for the absolute essential-value difference between two 
fruits (left bar) and a fruit and a cereal (right bar). These measures are based on Equation 1 
from Experiment 1. F refers to fruit and C refers to cereal
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Table 1
Food type, essential values (1/α), and r2 values for each subject in Figure 2
Subject Food 1/α r2
Jr. Mint
Grape 1.43E+06 0.95
Apple 1.67E+06 0.89
Honey Nut Cheerios 2.00E+06 0.95
Hotrod
Banana 8.33E+05 0.84
Apple 9.09E+05 0.81
Apple Jacks 1.39E+06 0.89
Shane
Grape 1.02E+06 0.83
Apple 1.01E+06 0.99
Honey Nut Cheerios 1.22E+06 0.79
Lenny
Grape 2.78E+06 0.85
Apple 2.94E+06 0.87
Fruit Loops 2.56E+06 0.95
Icarus
Banana 2.04E+05 0.94
Apple 3.85E+05 0.94
Honey Nut Cheerios 8.33E+05 0.87
Jaws
Blueberry 4.55E+05 0.88
Banana 3.45E+04 0.91
Cheerios 5.00E+05 0.74
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Table 2
Subjects, food alternatives, and choice ratios over 20 trials
Subjects Food Alternatives Choices
Jr. Mint Grape/Apple 20:0
Grape/Honey Nut Cheerios 18:2
Apple/Honey Nut Cheerios 4:16
Hotrod Banana/Apple 10:10
Banana/Apple Jacks 11:9
Apple/Apple Jacks 14:6
Shane Grape/Apple 19:1
Grape/Honey Nut Cheerios 20:0
Apple/Honey Nut Cheerios 9:11
Lenny Grape/Apple 20:0
Grape/Fruit Loops 20:0
Apple/Fruit Loops 0:20
Icarus Banana/Apple 3:17
Banana/Honey Nut Cheerios 1:19
Apple/Honey Nut Cheerios 7:13
Jaws Blueberry/Banana 20:0
Blueberry/Cheerios 15:5
Banana/Cheerios 0:20
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